RightTalkism. The idea that making the world a better place means changing how people talk. Just make people say the right things and all our problems will be solved. (HT Robin Hanson).
Dark morality. When morality—the heartfelt conviction that we are doing the right thing—fuels tribalism, dishonesty, bullying, censorship, hatred, terrorism, and genocide.
Dark idealism. When idealism—the heartfelt conviction that we are pure and noble and benevolent—fuels dark morality, by blinding us to our biases and making those who don’t share our ideals seem evil or subhuman.
A community tells a particular story about its own worst episodes. The man who molested children in the cheder and was moved quietly to another town was a single sick soul, an aberration the system failed to catch. The rabbis who signed the ban against a good man, the neighbors who crossed the street, the family that sat shiva for the daughter who married out, all of these were good people whose judgment lapsed, or whose fear got the better of their values, or who were misled by a few bad actors near the top. The account treats the cruelty as a failure of the ideal, a place where holiness was betrayed by the weakness of the men who carried it. Pinsof’s analysis of sacred ideology proposes something harder to absorb, which is that the cruelty is the conviction at work.
Pinsof gives two names to the engine. Dark morality is the heartfelt sense of doing right that drives bullying, censorship, shunning, and concealment. Dark idealism is the companion sense of one’s own purity and benevolence that blinds a man to his bias and recodes the men outside his ideal as corrupt or dangerous. The two run together. In his account of sacred ideology, a group cannot pursue dominance over rivals or guard its own standing in the plain language of interest, because a naked grab draws the negative inferences any onlooker, and any member, are built to draw. The group needs a moral pretext, and the pretext works only while the men inside believe it. The sincerity is not decoration on the dominance. The sincerity is the load-bearing wall. Propaganda that its own maker sees through fails. A cover-up that the protector experiences as a cover-up cannot hold. The conviction has to be real, and because it is real, it does the harshest work with a clean conscience.
The clearest institutional shape this takes in Jewish life is the cherem, the ban. When the Amsterdam community cast out Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) in 1656, and when the Vilna Gaon (Elijah ben Solomon Zalman, 1720-1797) and the mitnagdim placed the early Hasidim under ban a century later, the signatories did not understand themselves to be crushing dissent for the sake of their own authority. They understood themselves to be guarding the truth against a contamination that threatened every soul exposed to it. The same shape recurs in the present. When a circle of charedi authorities banned the books of a writer who had argued that the universe might be billions of years old and that the sages of the Talmud had erred in matters of natural science, the signatories framed the act as a defense of emunah against heresy, and many of them, by the common report, had not read the pages they condemned. Pinsof cites the finding that censorship feels acceptable to people in proportion as the censored ideas seem harmful. The ban is not experienced from inside as suppression. It is experienced as protection, and the man who lowers the gate feels the gratitude of a guardian.
What gives the conviction its reach is a vocabulary that converts the critic into a criminal before any argument begins. The apikoros has placed himself outside the circle of those whose objections deserve a hearing. The moser, the informer who carries a Jew’s wrongdoing to gentile authority, has committed a sin the tradition ranks among the gravest. The rodef, the pursuer, may be stopped by any means, including his death. Each of these categories had a defensible origin in a world where Jewish communities lived at the mercy of hostile powers and where an informer might bring collective punishment down on everyone. The categories survive into a world where the threat has changed, and in the survival they become the instruments by which a community recodes the man who exposes its sins as the man committing the sin. Pinsof’s account of the self-reinforcing sacred value predicts the move. Any attempt to name the protective logic as self-interest reads, to the people inside, as a cue of the namer’s own corruption, his disloyalty, his hatred of his own people, so that the act of exposure becomes the strongest evidence against the one who exposes.
The starkest case in living memory is the killing of Yitzhak Rabin (1922-1995). Through 1995 the words rodef and moser moved out of the study hall and into the pamphlets handed out at synagogues, as religious opponents of the Oslo accords debated whether a prime minister who ceded land and endangered Jewish lives fell under the law of the pursuer. The debate was not confined to obscure militants. By documented accounts, rabbis of standing took part, and a body of Orthodox rabbis in the United States is reported to have signed a declaration applying the category to Rabin. Yigal Amir (b. 1970), the law student who shot him, did not present himself as a murderer overcome by hatred. He presented himself as a man discharging an obligation, and he told his interrogators and the court that once a matter carries the status of a halachic ruling the moral question has been settled. The Israeli court called this a cynical misuse of the law, which is the comfortable reading, the reading that locates the evil in a bad actor twisting a good tradition. The harder reading, the one the frame presses, takes Amir at his word about his own sincerity, and finds in that sincerity the very thing that made the act possible. A man who knew he was committing murder might have flinched. A man who knew he was performing a mitzvah did not.
The same engine drives the protection of the institution over the person it harms. When a yeshiva learns that one of its rebbeim has abused a child, the logic that counsels silence does not present as a calculation of reputational risk, though that is what it is. It presents as the avoidance of chillul Hashem, the desecration of the divine name that follows when the failings of the observant are aired before a watching world, and as the defense of a place that does holy work, the transmission of Torah to the next generation, against an exposure that might cripple it and hand a weapon to its enemies. The institution carries the sacred work, so a threat to the institution reads as a threat to the sacred work, so the child’s claim is weighed against the survival of something the community holds holy and found lighter. This is dark idealism in its purest operation. The conviction of the institution’s purity does not merely permit the subordination of the victim. It requires it, and it lets the men who arrange the transfer and the silence feel themselves the protectors of something precious rather than the accomplices of a predator.
The reporting of abuse has been the subject of sustained halachic argument, and the argument has moved. The mainstream charedi position, associated with the ruling of Rav Yosef Shalom Elyashiv (1910-2012) and adopted by Agudath Israel of America, holds that where there is raglayim ladavar, reasonable ground to believe a child has been harmed, reporting to the civil authorities is not only permitted but required, and that the concern of mesirah does not bar it. The same position adds that the individual should bring the facts to a rabbi competent in both the law and the realities of abuse before he reports, and it is here that the argument turns sharp. Critics within Orthodoxy, among them Rabbi Yosef Blau of Yeshiva University and the advocates who emerged from the abuse cases themselves, contend that the requirement to consult first delays the report, deters the frightened, and in practice shields the accused, and that a rabbi without training has no standing to weigh the question at all. The Modern Orthodox and Religious Zionist worlds have moved further toward direct reporting. The disagreement is real, it is internal, and it is the place where the community argues with its own protective reflex.
The structure described here is human and universal. Pinsof draws his examples from the rhetoric of conquest dressed as denazification, from the doctrine of manifest destiny, from the ritual sacrifice that stratified ancient societies, and he locates the engine in the cognitive equipment shared by the species. Every group that carries a sacred ideology, every church and party and movement and nation that does holy work in its own telling, runs the same operation when a threat appears, cloaks its dominance and its self-protection in the language of virtue, and recodes its internal critics as enemies of the good. The Catholic dioceses that moved abusive priests from parish to parish reasoned about scandal to the faith in language a charedi askan knows well. The danger does not live in any group.
The shunning, the ban, the rodef ruling, and the quiet transfer of the predator are not the places where the sacred conviction failed. They are the places where it operated without obstruction. The comfortable account, the one that assigns the harm to a few corrupt men and leaves the ideal unstained, is the account under which the harm recurs, because it sends the community looking for bad apples and forbids it to look at the barrel. The uncomfortable account is the one that lets a community guard against its own certainty, a rule that the report goes to the police and not first to the rav, a refusal to let the holiness of the work decide the fate of the child, a suspicion trained on the moment when righteousness feels most certain. Truth over comfort is not a slogan here. It is the difference between a community that can protect a child from its own conviction and one that cannot.
